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The general conclusion of the empirical literature is that in-market consolidation
generates adverse price changes, harming consumers. Previous studies, however, look only
at the short-run pricing impact of consolidation, ignoring all effects that take longer to
materialize. Using a database that includes detailed information on the deposit rates of
individual banks in local markets for different categories of depositors, we investigate the
long-run price effects of M&As for the first time. We find strong evidence that, although
consolidation does generate adverse price changes, these are temporary. In the long run
efficiency gains dominate over the market power effect, leading to more favorable prices for
consumers.
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1
The last fifteen years have witnessed unprecedented numbers of mergers and
acquisitions ( M&As) in most countries, in mature and innovative sectors alike, from
retailing to telecommunications. In the last five years alone (1996-2000), there were 11,333
M&As operations in the U.S. and 7,423 in Europe, with total value equal to 3,684 and 1,541
billion dollars, respectively.
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One of the consequences of the wave of consolidations has been heightened concern
over possible anti-competitive effects (witness the recent European Commission’s decision
to block General Electric’s $43bn  takeover of Honeywell). Actually, the effect of
consolidation on market prices is,  a priori, ambiguous. On the one hand,  M&As may
improve efficiency, allowing economies of scale, synergies and better management of assets.
On the other hand, if the merging companies have significant local market overlap, their
market power might increase. If the efficiency effect dominates, mergers will lower costs
and lead to lower prices for consumers; if the increase in market power is dominant, the
deals will result in higher prices.
This paper examines the pricing effects of M&As in the market for bank deposits. The
deposit market constitutes a natural laboratory for studying these effects for three reasons.
First, competition is at the local level, allowing an examination of the pricing effects of
M&As in markets with different characteristics, while holding industry constant. Second, the
presence of large local players and the existence of barriers to entry into local deposit
markets (the cost of opening branches) imply that M&As can alter competitive conditions.
Third, bank deposits are a highly standardized product (some key characteristics are set by
law), so that they can be meaningfully compared over time and between different banks.
We depart from the previous literature in considering a longer period after the merger,
separating the short-run from the long-run impact. This enables us to examine pricing effects
that may have been overlooked to date.
Previous studies have generally found that consolidation leads to less competitive
pricing, harming consumers (see Kim and  Singal, 1993) for an analysis of the airline
industry and Prager and Hannan (1998) for an analysis of the banking industry. But these
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works only consider the short run and may well have missed effects that take longer to
become manifest. In fact, while firms can exercise the increased market power associated
with larger market share almost immediately, the improvements in efficiency may emerge
only after some time. This means that although consolidation may temporarily lead to
adverse price changes, it may turn out to be beneficial to consumers in the long run.
The efficiency gains from mergers may be delayed by several factors. First, cost-
cutting takes time. In fact, the managers of merged firms may want to restructure (e.g.
consolidating headquarters, closing overlapping branches) gradually, in order to  minimize
adjustment costs and allow time to assess the results as plans are implemented. Cost
reductions may also be delayed by reluctance to lay off staff - especially in businesses
where human capital is important, such as financial services and hi-tech industries - or by
difficulties in selling redundant capital goods (see Pulvino, 1998 on the airline industry).
Second, merging disparate workforces is no easy task (see Kole and Lehn, 2000) and
may thus be a lengthy process. Practitioners indicate that in all the major industrial countries
differences in corporate attitudes represent one of the main obstacles to the mergers (see
Group of Ten, 2001). Differences in communication styles, customer needs and distribution
channels, for example, could hamper exchange of information and even impede the
development of a coherent corporate identity, thus aggravating the difficulty of getting two
firms to work as one. Therefore, the  reorganization of the merged firms can hardly be
completed overnight.
For bank mergers, the long lags that are likely between the completion of the merger
and the value gains are well documented (see Rhoades 1998, Calomiris and Karceski, 2000
and Houston, James and Ryngaert, 2001). Such lags have been taken into consideration in
studying the effects of M&As on small business lending (Berger, Saunders,  Scalise and
Udell, 1998), stock market reactions to merger announcements (Madura and Wiant, 1994)
and the importance of the various sources of value gains from mergers (Houston, James and
Ryngaert, 2001). However, they have not been considered in previous analyses of pricing
effects.
This discussion suggests that a comprehensive assessment of the competitive effects of
M&As requires an analysis of the price changes generated by mergers in the long run. The
data needed to perform such investigation are not generally available, but they turn out to be
available for Italy. For this country, we have access to a unique  dataset with detailed
information on the deposit rates of individual banks in local markets over nearly a decade
(1990-98). We observe interest rates for different categories of deposits (small and large
deposits, households and firms deposits, etc.), so that we can examine the effect of M&As on
each category. We also have data on the characteristics of the local markets. Thus, our
sample allows for an in-depth analysis of the relation between market structure (e.g.
concentration) and the pricing effects of M&As. The availability of this dataset has prompted
us to focus on Italy to analyze the short-run as well as the long-run effects of  M&As on
prices. To our knowledge this is the first such study for any market.
We examine whether the deposit rates of the consolidated banks diverge from those of
the control sample, distinguishing temporary from permanent changes. Consistent with
previous research, we find that in the short run consolidation increases market power, and
lowers the deposit rate by about 16.6 basis points (3.3 percent of market rates) in the year of11
the merger. In the long run, however, the deposit rate of merged banks rises, eventually
reaching 13 basis points above its pre-merger level. This finding is consistent with the notion
that in the long run mergers benefit consumers.
One objection to the significance of these results is that the mergers examined may not
actually generate substantial market power, possibly because they are too small to affect
competitive conditions. To address this issue, we examine sub-samples that are highly
vulnerable to an increase in market power, where the short-run fall in the deposit rates of the
merged banks should be larger. According to our hypothesis, however, in the long run the
deposit rates of the merged banks should nonetheless increase relative to the control sample.
We find that for the sub-samples that are sensitive to market power in the short-run the
deposit rate falls more than average, but in the long run it rises relative to the control group.
We also compare the price changes induced by in-market mergers with those induced
by out-of-market mergers, which do not modify local market shares and thus only affect
banks’ efficiency, not their market power. According to our hypothesis, in the short run out-
of-market mergers should have no effect on the deposit rates but in the long run should
improve efficiency and lead to higher rates relative to the control sample. And this is indeed
what we find, with no short-term change and a long term increase equal to 11 basis points.
Finally, we explore the alternative hypothesis that the long-run rise in the deposit rates
of the merged banks does not reflect efficiency gains but a deterioration in quality.
Difficulties in integrating the merging parties could result in poorer quality of services,
inducing the merged banks to compensate dissatisfied depositors with higher rates. However,
the post-merger rate changes are not explained by proxies for service quality. Instead,
deposit rates rise only for banks that are successful in reducing costs after the merger. These
findings lend empirical support to the hypothesis that in the long run mergers improve
efficiency.
Our results carry important implications for the debate on the wealth transfers
associated with consolidation, providing support for the view that the value gains from
mergers represent gains in economic efficiency (see Jensen, 1988), not simply redistributions
from consumers to other stakeholders. Our findings complement those of previous studies
that suggest that mergers are complex events, whose economic consequences must be
evaluated considering important characteristics of the deals, such as the market share of the
target firm (see Sapienza, 2002) or the product lines involved in the transaction (see Kahn,
Pennacchi and  Sopranzetti, 2000). To assess the welfare implications of consolidation
properly, the effects of mergers must be analyzed over a period long enough to let the
efficiency gains emerge; the findings of investigations that look only at a short post-merger
period may be reversed when a longer horizon is considered.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the literature. In section 3 we
describe the data and the econometric tests. In section 4 we investigate the effects of M&As
for the entire sample. Section 5 presents the sub-sample analysis. Section 6 examines the
competing explanations of the rate changes. Section 7 concludes.12
2. Market power and efficiency effects
There are several ways in which M&As can increase efficiency. First, the larger firms
that result from consolidation may gain access to cost-saving technologies or spread their
fixed costs over a larger base, thus reducing average costs. The efficiency gains may also
derive from the exploitation of economies of scope: the deal may allow the merging parties
to enter new markets and cross-sell their products to a wider customer base. Finally,
consolidation may improve managerial efficiency.
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However, the fact that merged firms may become more efficient does not necessarily
mean efficiency gains will be passed on to consumers via lower prices. In fact, consolidation
may increase market power, thus leading to higher prices and lower levels of activity. The
effect of M&As on prices depends on several factors, such as the characteristics of the deal
(e.g. in-market or out-of-market), the ease of market entry by potential competitors, the
geographical scope of the markets involved (local, national, possibly international). The
direction of the changes in market prices induced by consolidation is therefore ambiguous, as
depends on whether the market power or the efficiency effect prevails.
Several papers have examined firms’ ability to exercise market power in a static
framework, investigating the relationship between market concentration and prices (see, for
example, Hannan 1991 for loan rates and Berger and  Hannan 1989 for deposit rates) or
between market concentration and profits (see for example Berger, 1995). However, drawing
inferences on the pricing effects of  M&As on the basis of the static literature may be
problematic for two reasons. First, it requires assuming that the consolidating firms are
comparable to the others. But the fact that they are involved in a merger while the others are
not is an indication that they are different in (possibly unobservable) ways that might
influence their pricing policies. Second, the relationship between market concentration and
prices may differ according to the reasons for the increase in concentration. For example,
concentration might increase because of the expansion of the most efficient firms, with
favorable effects on prices.
Dynamic analyses — focusing on the pricing strategies of the merged firms as
compared with the behavior of the others — provide direct evidence on the effects of M&As
on market prices. However, because of lack of data, few studies have directly investigated
the pricing effects of M&As.
The general conclusion of the dynamic studies is that in-market consolidation
generates substantial market power. In an insightful analysis of the price effect of mergers in
the U.S. airline industry, Kim and Singal (1993) find that the merging firms raised airfares
by 9.44 percent relative to the routes unaffected by the merger. Prager and Hannan (1998)
find that M&As that violate the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) bank merger guidelines
4
substantially reduce the deposit rates paid by the merged banks. Using a data set on
                                                                
3  For a comprehensive review of studies on scale and scope economies and managerial x-efficiency in the
banking industry see Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999).
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individual loan contracts, Sapienza (2002) finds that loan rates increase when the target has a
large local market share. Kahn, Pennacchi and Sopranzetti (2000) find that large in-market
mergers lead to greater market power in the pricing of personal loans but reduce automobile
loan rates.
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One problem with these results is that the post-merger period examined in the previous
studies may be too short to capture the full effect on market prices.
6 In fact, while market
power can be exercised immediately after the deal, since it only requires that the local
manager of the merged firm modify his pricing strategy to exploit the larger market share,
the value gains are likely to take a long time to become manifest. This means that studies
restricted to a short post-merger period might fail to account for the efficiency gains and thus
overestimate the adverse price changes.
For bank mergers, long lags in the improvement of performance may reflect
difficulties in refocusing lending policies, rationalizing branches, integrating data processing
systems and operations, training the personnel of the target to market the new owner’s
products. Moreover, culture clashes may be especially harmful in banking, as the
relationships with customers depend heavily on soft information, which is more difficult to
transfer than such objective information as balance sheet data (Rajan, 1992). The resignation
of key executives or the emergence of morale problems due to reassignments or employee
turnover may cause the loss of information, especially when the new management has little
time to develop customer information.
Berger, Saunders,  Scalise and  Udell (1998) and  Calomiris and  Karceski (2000)
mention three years as the gestation period needed to restructure the merged bank. This
squares with the results of the interviews conducted by the Federal Reserve Board staff with
officials of banks involved in mergers (see Rhoades, 1998): “Most of the firms projected that
the cost savings would be fully achieved within three years after the merger, with the
majority of savings being achieved after two years”. In a study of large bank mergers in the
U.S., Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001) analyze management projections on the timing of
cost savings and revenue enhancements. They find that cost savings and revenue gains take
two to four years. These indications are in line with the experience of bank managers in Italy
(see for example Bizzocchi, 1999).
In this paper we investigate the pricing effects of M&As over nine years (1990-98),
separating the short-run from the long-run consequences. We analyze the Italian market for
retail deposits. This provides an ideal framework for our study for several reasons. First,
technological innovation and thorough-going deregulation prompted an unprecedented wave
of M&As that cut the number of banks in Italy by nearly 25 percent, from 1,176 in 1989 to
867 in 1998. Second, the market for retail deposits is fragmented into a large number of local
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markets (the Italian provinces):
7 banks design their strategies and set their deposit rates
primarily in response to supply and demand in each province, not in response to conditions
prevailing in the  neighboring areas.
8 This means that we can compare banks’ pricing
strategies in different local markets within the same industry, taking local market structure
into consideration. Third, the characteristics of bank deposits are highly homogeneous over
time and across banks, largely because some of the key elements of the deposit contract are
defined by law. The Civil Code defines the basic obligations of the parties involved in a
deposit contract (Articles 1834, 1835 and 1836) and the minimum requirements for contract
content (Articles 1341 and 1342), while contract disclosure is regulated by the 1993 Banking
Law.
9 Moreover, unlike other bank products (e.g. loans), deposits are virtually unaffected by
asymmetric information. Therefore, by focusing on the effect of M&As on deposit rates we
prevent the estimates of the market power and efficiency effects from being blurred by
changes in product characteristics or inadequate control for borrower risk.
3. Methodology and data
3.1  Sources
We have three main sources of data. Interest rates and the value of outstanding
deposits come from the Central Credit Register. Banks’ balance sheet and income statement
information come from the Banking Supervision Register at the Bank of Italy. Data on the
mergers and acquisitions are drawn from the Census of Banks.
The Central Credit Register is a department of the Bank of Italy that collects data on
the interest rates on deposits above €10,300 ($9,000). The banks that report deposit rates
have agreed to file detailed information with a breakdown by size of deposit (below or above
€25,000),
10 type of depositor (households, financial firms and non-financial firms) and
branch location (province).
11 The deposit rate is the ratio of the payment made in each period
by the bank to the account holder to the average balance of the deposit. The interest payment
is net of the expenses charged by the bank to the account holder (e.g., the cost of mailing the
account statement).
The Banking Supervision Register also provides the data on the deposits of individual
banks in each province, with a breakdown by size of the deposit and type of depositor, which
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9  See Carriero (1997).
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11  For a detailed description of the Central Credit Register see Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998).15
we use to calculate the Herfindhal-Hirschman index (HHI) for the local deposit markets.
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Finally, we supplement these data with several province-specific indicators, such as the
number of new banks entering each local market and per capita GDP.
3.2  Sample
We restrict our attention to households’ deposits. Firms are excluded because they use
their banks not only for transaction accounts, but mainly for other key financial products
(lending, underwriting, etc.), so that interest rates on firms’ deposits may be strongly
influenced by factors that are unrelated to developments in the deposit market. The
remuneration of a firm’s deposit is likely to be affected by the conditions that are agreed
upon on the lending side of the relationship or by other firm-specific factors, and estimates
of the pricing effects of M&As including firms’ deposits may accordingly be unreliable.
We focus on current accounts, which are highly homogeneous deposit products
13,14 and
therefore have ideal features for our analysis. First, the bank can change the remuneration of
the account at any point in time; the account holder, in turn, can close the account without
notice. This means that (i) differences in the deposit rates are not influenced by differences
in maturity; (ii) changes in efficiency or market power that modify banks’ pricing policy can
have almost immediate repercussions on the remuneration of current accounts. Second,
current accounts do not include overdraft facilities or minimum balance requirements.
Therefore their interest rates are not influenced by differences in the characteristics of the
accounts and can be meaningfully compared across banks.
The banks reporting detailed deposit rate data decreased from 78 in 1990 to 56 in 1998
(Table 1). These reporting banks are larger than average, and they account for two-thirds of
total banking industry deposits. The number of bank-province observations ranges from
1,164 in 1990 to 1,374 in 1996; the branch network of the reporting banks covers an average
of 19 provinces.
We concentrate on the provinces affected by in-market mergers, i.e. those that before
the consolidation were served by both merger participants (the bidder and the target bank).
Here, mergers have the potential to influence both efficiency and market power; controlling
the same market share with one bank instead of two may increase the market power of the
local manager. In our sample 39 banks were involved in in-market deals and we find 193
bank-province observations of in-market deals (1.6 percent of the total number of bank-
province observations).
                                                                
12  The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares of all active banks.
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14  Other products included in the original data set (CDs and term deposits) were excluded from the
analysis since detailed information on their maturity is not available.16
Table 1
MERGERS INVOLVING THE BANKS THAT REPORT DEPOSIT RATES
The data refer to the Italian banks that report the interest rate paid on current accounts held by households (the
“reporting banks”).  Percentage of industry deposits is the ratio of the deposits of the reporting banks to the
deposits of all Italian banks. Number of bank local-market observations is the sum (over banks) of the Italian
provinces served by the reporting banks. Number of banks involved in mergers is the number of reporting
banks that were involved in at least one in-market consolidation during the year. Number of bank local-market
observations affected by mergers is the number of provinces that before the mergers were served by both the
bidder and target banks.





No. of bank local-
market
observations
No. of  banks
involved
in mergers
No. of bank local-
market observations
affected by mergers
1990 78 65.5 1,164 4 15
1991 75 65.7 1,219 6 27
1992 72 66.9 1,302 6 41
1993 72 66.2 1,336 2 18
1994 67 66.1 1,326 5 20
1995 65 66.6 1,288 9 55
1996 63 66.1 1,374 3 9
1997 59 65.2 1,359 1 1
1998 56 65.5 1,293 3 7
Average 67 66.0 1,296 4 21
Summary statistics on the deposit rates for the bank-province pairs are reported in
Table 2. In Panel A we report the interest rates on deposits below €25,000 ($23,000, which
we designate as small deposits), while in Panel B we report the interest rates on deposits
larger than €25,000 (large deposits). For small deposits, the average rate declined from 6.9
per cent in 1990 to under 3 per cent in 1998. The rates exhibit substantial variability between
provinces: for example the figures for 1992 range from a minimum of 3.96 per cent to a
maximum of 10.92 per cent. The interest rate on large deposits exhibits similar
characteristics, with a decline from 7.34 per cent in 1990 to 3.06 per cent in 1998.
Panel C shows summary statistics on the reporting banks. The median size is €22.8
billion ($20 billion). The ratio of bad loans to total lending (a proxy for riskiness) is equal to
6.3 percent, while the ratio of operating costs to gross revenues (a standard indicator of
efficiency) is 69.4 percent. Panel D contains summary statistics on the local markets. The
median value of the provincial HHI of the deposit market is 1,610, ranging from a low of
520 to a high of 5,680. For each province we construct a dummy that is set equal to 1 when a
new bank enters the market (we exclude entry due to  M&As). The figures in Panel D
indicate that each year 3.2 percent of Italian provinces show an increase in the number of
banks. Finally, we report data on per capita GDP and the growth rate.Table 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS
The summary statistics of Panel A and Panel B refer to the province-specific interest rates on households’ deposits
paid by a sample of large banks (the “reporting banks”). The mean, median and standard deviation are calculated
across provinces for each year in the sample. The summary statistics of Panel C refer to the reporting banks. Size is
the bank’s total assets in millions of euros. Bad loans is a percentage of total loans. Cost-income ratio is the ratio of
overhead to gross income. The summary statistics of Panel D refer to the Italian provinces. Market concentration is
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the deposit market, calculated for each province as the sum of the squared
market shares of all active banks. New banks is a dummy equal to 1 when a new bank enters the local market. GDP
per capita is in euros. GDP growth is the annual growth of GDP in real terms. The number of observations is the




Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: Interest rate on small deposits (below €25,000)
Year:
1990 1,164 6.90 6.87 0.70 3.00 9.50
1991 1,219 6.87 6.84 0.73 2.50 9.16
1992 1,302 7.39 7.29 0.96 3.96 10.92
1993 1,336 5.53 5.55 0.77 2.77 8.02
1994 1,326 4.85 4.80 0.61 2.83 6.69
1995 1,288 5.53 5.52 0.57 2.81 7.33
1996 1,374 4.46 4.48 0.63 1.85 6.35
1997 1,359 3.19 3.21 0.55 0.89 5.05
1998 1,293 2.66 2.69 0.40 0.79 4.19
Panel B: Interest rate on large deposits (above €25,000)
Year:
1990 1,158 7.39 7.34 0.80 2.89 10.76
1991 1,215 7.32 7.27 0.77 2.53 9.62
1992 1,302 7.93 7.81 1.10 2.32 11.58
1993 1,332 5.92 5.89 0.79 2.25 8.96
1994 1,322 5.23 5.14 0.70 2.38 7.35
1995 1,288 5.97 5.95 0.70 2.07 9.67
1996 1,370 4.85 4.83 0.69 2.04 7.46
1997 1,357 3.59 3.59 0.61 1.17 5.70
1998 1,292 3.04 3.06 0.45 1.05 5.05
Panel  C: The reporting banks
Variables:
Size 11,661 22,782 29,131 22,530 576 91,697
Bad loans 11,661 6.30 7.32 5.23 0.07 59.52
Cost-income ratio 11,661 69.44 69.87 14.08 44.74 333.33
Panel  D: The local markets
Variables:
Market concentration 11,661 1,610 1,771 807 519 5,685
New banks 11,661 0 0.033 0.178 0 1
GDP per capita 11,661 14,874 14,914 3,983 6,065 26,518
GDP growth 11,661 1.94 1.47 2.44 -9.72 10.0718
3.3  Test design
In this section we describe the econometric methodology used in the empirical study
and our basic tests. We investigate whether in-market mergers produce an increase or a
decrease in the deposit rate of the merging banks relative to the control sample. If a deal
improves efficiency, it should allow the merging bank to raise its deposit rates, whereas if it
only increases the bank’s local market power, the deposit rate should fall. Of course, mergers
could influence both efficiency and market power. Thus a reduction of the deposit rate of the
merging banks relative to the non-merging ones would indicate that the market power effect
dominates the efficiency gains; on the contrary, a positive rate change would be consistent
with the hypothesis that the efficiency gains prevail over the market power effect.
We separate the transitory from the permanent effects of M&As. Following Kim and
Singal (1993), we analyze two sub-periods: transition and completion. The transition period
covers the year of the merger and the next two.
15 The completion period i ncludes all
subsequent years. We assume that the deals increase market power beginning in the
transition period, and thus we expect a decline in the deposit rate of merged banks relative to
non-merged ones. During the completion period the restructuring should produce its effects,
presumably leading to a rise in the deposit rates relative to the control group.
We estimate the following fixed-effects regression:
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where ri,k,t is the relative interest rate paid in year t by bank i on the deposits held by
households in province k, measured by the difference between the bank’s deposit rate and
the 3-month interbank interest rate.  INMERGEi k t , ,
0 2 - is a dummy that is equal to 1 if in year t or
in the previous two years (the transition period) bank i merged with a target that before the
consolidation was already operating in province k, i.e. if it was involved in a deal that
increased its local market share.  INMERGEi k t , ,
3+  is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the merger
took place three or more years before (that is, it stands for the completion period).
16 PROVk,t
and  BANKi,t are, respectively, a set of time varying province- and bank-specific control
variables. uk is a province-specific fixed effect and dt is a time dummy. Finally, we include a
zero-mean random error ei,k,t.
                                                                
15  We make this choice for two reasons. First, we want to make our results comparable with those of the
previous studies, which cover at most two years after the merger. Second, this is the period that practitioners
consider necessary to achieve most of the cost savings. We check the robustness of our results to this choice.
16   Throughout the paper we report the estimates obtained by setting INMERGEi k t , ,
3+  equal to 1 at t=3, 4, 5.
We check that all results are unchanged by the inclusion of all years with t>5.19
Within the framework of equation (1), our hypotheses translate into testable
predictions on the coefficients. The hypothesis that in the short run mergers increase the
market power would imply  ß0–2<0. The hypothesis that in the completion period the
efficiency gains prevail over the increase in market power implies ß3+>0, while a negative
value for ß3+ would indicate that the market power effect outweighs the efficiency gains.
We include a full set of province dummies in consideration of the significant
differences among the deposit rates between different geographic areas in Italy (see
Attanasio et al., 2002). These dummies account for province-specific characteristics such as,
for example, whether the province is located in the North or in the South. By including a
calendar-year fixed effect we control for cyclical patterns common to all banks and
provinces. The bank variables capture the relation between the deposit rates and the banks’
characteristics (to avoid simultaneity, all variables are lagged one year). We include size (the
log of total assets) and proxies for risk (the ratio of bad loans to total lending) and efficiency
(the cost-income ratio). We also control for province-specific variables. First, we include the
HHI of the deposit market, a standard proxy of the degree of market power. To capture the
increase in competition prompted by the geographical expansion of Italian banks in the
nineties (see Angelini and Cetorelli, 2002), we include a dummy to control for bank entry
into local markets. Finally, we include the provincial per capita GDP. To check whether our
results are sensitive to the chosen specification, we have also estimated models including
other bank and province characteristics (see below).
4. Results for the entire sample
4.1  The merging banks
Table 3 reports the estimates of equation (1).
17 Panel A shows that in the transition
period the deposit rate of the consolidating banks decreases by 13.5 basis points relative to
non-merging banks, while in the completion period it increases by 12.6 basis points (both
effects are strongly significant). This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that in the
short run mergers cause consumer-adverse price changes but that their long run effect is
beneficial.
                                                                
17  The table contains the regression coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis, and the R-square of
each regression. The standard errors are corrected for general heteroskedasticity.Table 3
EFFECT OF M&AS ON HOUSEHOLDS’ DEPOSIT RATES
In the basic regression (Panel A) we estimate the following specification:








where t k i r , ,  is the relative interest rate paid in year t by bank  i on deposits held by households in province  k
(measured by the difference between the bank’s deposit rate and the 3-month interbank rate),  2 0
, ,
-
t k i INMERGE is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if in year t or in the previous two years (the transition period) bank i merged with a target
that before the consolidation was already operating in the province, + 3
, , t k i INMERGE is a dummy equal to 1 if the deal
took place three or more years earlier (the completion period),  t k PROV ,  and  t i BANK ,  are, respectively, province-
and bank-specific variables, uk  is a province-specific fixed effect and dt is a calendar year-specific effect,ei k t , ,  is a
zero-mean random error. In Panel B we report the results of estimating the rate changes determined by mergers for
each year separately. In Panel C we report the results of estimating the rate changes determined by mergers on the pro
forma deposit rates of the consolidating banks. Size is the banks’ total assets. Bad loans are is a percentage of total
loans. Cost-Income ratio is overhead divided by gross income. Market concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index of the provincial deposit market (the coefficient is multiplied by 100). New banks is a dummy equal to 1 when
a new bank enters the local market. GDP per capita is in euros. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; *
between 5 and 10 per cent.
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C:
Variables Short-run and
long-run effect
Year by year effect Pro-forma deposit
rates
Transition period (years 0-2) -0.135 *** -0.146 ***
(0.019) (0.019)
Year 0 -0.166 ***
(0.034)
Year 1 -0.123 ***
(0.027)
Year 2 -0.072 **
(0.028)




Year 4 0.097 ***
(0.028)
Year 5 0.245 ***
(0.038)
Size (log value) -0.051 *** -0.051 *** -0.045 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Bad loans 0.031 *** 0.031 *** 0.038 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cost-income ratio -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.012 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Market concentration -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
New banks 0.190 *** 0.192 *** 0.160 ***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
GDP per capita (log value) -0.728 *** -0.729 *** -0.700 ***
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118)
No. of observations 23,297 23,297 23,027
R-Square 0.878 0.878 0.88021
The price changes are not huge, but the gains for consumers are not trivial. These
gains, to put them in perspective, come to approximately 252 dollars for a consumer holding
a deposit of $10,000.
18
To check that our result does not depend on our definition of the transition and
completion periods, we re-estimate the model including a separate dummy for each of the
years following the merger. The coefficients of these dummies, reported in Panel B of Table
3, confirm that our results are not driven by any single year. In particular, the coefficients are
negative and statistically significant for all years in the transition period. In contrast, for t=3,
4 and 5 the effect is positive (for t=3 the coefficient is not significant). The coefficients for
the individual years indicate that in t=0 (the merger year) the increase in market power leads
to a decline of the deposit rate of 16.6 basis points (3.3 percent of the average deposit rate in
our sample period). The deposit rates of merged banks start recovering in t=1. From t=3 they
exceed their pre-merger levels (relative to the control sample).
The reduction of the deposit rate of merged banks in the transition period could reflect
differences between the rates of the bidder and target. For example, if before the merger the
deposit rates of the target were lower than those of the bidder, afterwards we might find a
fall in the deposit rate of the new bank even when the deposit rates remain unchanged. We
probe this issue further by considering the effects of mergers on the pro forma rates (the
average of the local pre-merger rate of the bidder and target banks):
19 if the rate reduction in
the transition period is not due to market power but simply to balance-sheet consolidation,
the effect should vanish using the pro forma rates. The results, reported in Panel C of Table
3, confirm the previous ones.
The coefficients of the bank and province variables are all significant and have the
expected sign. Deposit rates are lower for inefficient banks (high ratio of costs to gross
income) and for large banks and higher for riskier banks (high ratio of bad loans to t otal
lending). The deposit rates are lower in provinces with high GDP per capita, where the
transactional demand for deposits is presumably greater. As expected, the deposit rate is also
lower in provinces with high market concentration. Finally, the deposit rate changes
favorably to consumers when new competitors enter the local market.
4.2  The rival banks
A change in the pricing policy of the merging banks might also influence the pricing
policy of rival banks, i.e. other banks operating in the provinces affected by consolidation.
Previous research suggests that the rivals’ reaction differs according to the effects of the
merger. Some studies have found that when the market power effect prevails the rivals adopt
a “follower” strategy, changing their prices unfavorably to consumers (see Kim and Singal,
                                                                
18  The value of the gain for the depositor has been calculated discounting the permanent yearly gain
($12.6) at a 5 percent nominal rate. This calculation does not consider the temporary loss suffered by
consumers in the transition period.
19  The results reported in the table are weighted averages, but simple averages are virtually identical.22
1993 and Praeger and Hannan, 1998). In contrast, when the efficiency gains dominate, the
rivals (which do not benefit from these gains) may leave their prices unchanged, as they
would find it unprofitable to follow the pricing policy of the merging banks (see Kahn,
Pennacchi and Sopranzetti, 2000).
In the previous analysis we did not distinguish the rival banks from the other non-
merging banks. In order to examine whether our results are affected by this choice, we




t k i RIVAL ) that equals 1 if in year t or in the previous two years bank i
was exposed in province k to a merger that involved the acquisition of at least 1 percent of
the local deposit market.
20 We then define a dummy (
+ 3
, , t k i RIVAL ) that refers to a bank that is a
rival of a deal that took place three or more years before. We then run the following
regression:
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The results of equation (2) are reported in Panel A of Table 4. The rate changes of the
merged banks do not differ from those reported in Table 3: after a temporary decrease in the
transition period, the deposit rate increases relative to the control sample. The size of the
price changes is also similar to that of Table 3.
The rivals change their rates very little: their deposit rates decline by 2.4 basis points in
the transition period and by 6 basis points in the completion period (both coefficients are
highly significant). An F-test indicates that  2 0- b is statistically different from  2 0- f : in the
transition period the rivals lower their rates less than merged banks. Moreover, the deposit
rates of the rivals do not change between the transition and the completion period (an F-test
indicates that  2 0- f  is not statistically different from + 3 f ). A possible interpretation of these
results is that the rivals follow the price changes of the merging banks only in the transition
period, when the market power effect prevails; in the completion period, when the merging
banks pass gains on to depositors, the rivals leave their deposit rates unchanged.
                                                                




t k i RIVAL  (with j„i and h„i) is set to 1 if
two conditions hold: (a) both j and h were serving the province before the deal; (b) the market share of bank h
in the year before the merger was at least 1 percent.Table 4
EFFECT OF M&AS ON HOUSEHOLDS’ DEPOSIT RATES:
IN-MARKET (MERGING BANKS AND RIVAL BANKS) AND OUT-OF-MARKET
MERGERS
Panel A reports the results of estimating equation (2) of the paper. Panel B reports the results of estimating equation (3) of
the paper. Size is the banks’ total assets. Bad loans is a percentage of total loans. Cost-Income ratio is overhead divided by
gross income. Market concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the provincial deposit market (the coefficient is
multiplied by 100). New banks is a dummy equal to 1 when a new bank enters the local market. GDP per capita is in euros.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per
cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent.
Panel A: Panel B:
Variables In-market mergers: merging




Transition period (years 0-2) -0.146 *** -0.133 ***
(0.019) (0.019)
Completion period (years 3+) 0.115 *** 0.139 ***
(0.019) (0.019)
Rivals of in-market mergers
Transition period (years 0-2) -0.024 * —
(0.014)
Completion period (years 3+) -0.057 *** —
(0.015)
Out-of-market mergers
Transition period (years 0-2) — -0.010
(0.010)
Completion period (years 3+) — 0.112 ***
(0.010)
Size (log value) -0.050 *** -0.057 ***
(0.005) (0.005)
Bad loans 0.031 *** 0.031 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
Cost-income ratio -0.006 *** -0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
Market concentration -0.010 *** -0.011 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
New banks 0.182 *** 0.215 ***
(0.040) (0.040)
GDP per capita (log value) -0.716 *** -0.720 ***
(0.118) (0.118)
No. of  observations 23,297 23,297
R-square 0.878 0.87924
4.3  Out-of-market mergers
In this section we analyze the rate changes that occur in provinces affected by out-of-
market mergers, i.e. those that before the consolidation were served by only one of the
merging banks (the bidder or the target). According to our hypothesis, there should be no
variation in the deposit rate during the transition period, as market power has not changed
(these mergers do not modify local market shares)
21 while the efficiency gains have not yet
been realized. In the completion period, by contrast, the efficiency gains could result in a rise
in the merged banks’ deposit rate.
We define two dummies:  OUTMERGEi k t , ,
0 2 -  is set to 1 if in year t or in the previous two
years bank i  merged with a bank that before the deal had no branches in province  k.
Analogously,  OUTMERGEi k t , ,
3+  refers to out-of-market mergers that took place three or more
years before. We then estimate the following regression:
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The inclusion of the out-of-market dummies does not affect the size and significance
of the pricing effects of in-market mergers (see Panel B of Table 4).
22 Regarding out-of-
market mergers, in the transition period the deposit rate of the consolidating banks does not
change, which is consistent with the hypothesis that these deals do not generate additional
market power. In the long run the deposit rate rises by 11.2 basis points, supporting the
hypothesis that consolidation benefits consumers.
4.4   Robustness of the estimates
We undertake several analyses to assess the robustness of results to the inclusion of
other bank- and firm-specific control variables and the use of alternative estimation methods.
They have negligible effects on the results.
                                                                
21  By increasing the number of geographical markets in which firms compete simultaneously, even out-of-
market mergers may increase market power, consistent with the multi-market contact hypothesis (MMC): firms
that compete with each other in many markets may recognize that aggressive behavior in one market may lead
to retaliation elsewhere. As a consequence, they may reduce competition in the affected markets (see Bernheim
and Whinston, 1990). Tests of the MMC in the banking industry do not find significant evidence of collusion
(see Pilloff, 1999 for the U.S. and De Bonis and Ferrando, 2000 for Italy).
22  We run regressions including both the RIVAL and the OUTMERGE dummies. The results are similar to
those reported in Table 4.25
First, we run regressions including banks’ profitability (ROA) and deposit-to-assets
ratio. We also include the provincial rate of growth of GDP and the rate of inflation. These
alternative variables are generally not significant and do not affect the merger dummies.
A potential problem in our estimates is that we do not consider the mergers that took
place before 1990: in fact, the provinces affected by a merger before 1990 could be included
in our control sample, thereby biasing our results. To examine this issue, we identify mergers
that occurred between 1985 and 1989 using the sample of  Focarelli, Panetta and  Salleo
(2002) and modify our merger dummies to take them into account. We then re-estimate
equation (1) and obtain results similar to those reported in Table 3.
The merging banks could also modify their pricing policy even before the merger. The
mere announcement could prompt local managers to collude in order to exercise market
power. If this were so, our analysis might underestimate the market power effect of M&As.




t k i INMERGE ) that identifies the year before the merger
(t=-1). However, this dummy is not significant
23 and its inclusion in the regression does not
affect our results.
We also re-estimate our model (i) including two province-specific fixed effects, one
for small deposits and one for large deposits; (ii) including a fixed effect for each bank-
province pair, i.e. a dummy that captures potential heterogeneities that might arise within
each bank in different provinces; and (iii) using a random effects model. None of our main
results are affected by these alternative estimation techniques.
We then  specialize the Huber-White standard errors to relax the assumption of
independence among the observations that refer to different banks in the same province and
to allow for the possibility that banks adopt uniform pricing across provinces within each
region.
24 These changes affect the significance of the province-specific variables, albeit only
marginally, but do not influence the coefficients of the merger dummies.
Another potential concern with our analysis is that deposits are just one of the products
banks offer to their customers. This means that the deposit rates used in our regressions
could be affected by strategies for marketing other products to households — for example,
one bank may offer a high deposit rate but charge a higher rate on loans. Although we
mitigate this risk by focusing on homogeneous products and by concentrating on
households’ deposits (which are much less subject to this problem than firms’ deposits), we
cannot eliminate it. However, this problem is likely to be negligible for our analysis. In fact,
deposits are by far the most important financial product purchased by Italian households
from their bank, while only a tiny fraction of households purchase other important financial
products: in our sample period only 4 percent of the households holding bank deposits also
resorted to bank consumer credit.
25
                                                                
23  This result differs from previous ones. A possible explanation for this difference is that we do not
identify the exact date of the merger, but only the year of the merger. This means that the time period identified
by our dummies for the transition period already covers some pre-merger months.
24  Italy has 20 regions, comprising from 1 to 11 provinces.
25  The figures in the text are estimated on the basis of the Survey of Household Income and Wealth for
1991, 1993 and 1995.26
Finally, the changes in the deposit rates of merged banks could simply reflect
modifications in the quality of services, rather than changes in market power and efficiency.
This issue is taken up in section 6.
5. Results for sub-samples
We have seen that while in the short run in-market mergers result in lower deposit
rates, in the long run consolidation leads to better rates for consumers. However, there is a
possible weakness: the mergers in our sample might not be such as to generate substantial
market power. For example, they could be too small to alter the competitive conditions of
the local markets, so our results might not be comparable with those of previous studies and
might suffer from a lack of generality. To address this concern, we now investigate the
effects of M&As on sub-samples of customers and markets that are highly vulnerable to an
increase in market power. According to our hypothesis, for these sub-samples too the deposit
rate should rise in the completion period, although in the short run the  anticompetitive
effects could be larger than average.
5.1  Differences between small and large deposits
The market power effects of in-market mergers may differ for deposits of different
sizes. In fact, for small deposits the costs of shopping for better conditions could exceed the
gains from a rise in the deposit rate;
26 this means that the local manager could take advantage
of the larger market share and cut the remuneration of these deposits with negligible
consequences for the volume of business. On the contrary, an attempt to lower the rate on
large deposits could induce the customer to move to a different bank. Therefore, the increase
in market power is likely to be greatest with respect to small deposits. Accordingly, in the
transition period we expect a larger rate reduction for small deposits than for large deposits.
In terms of equation (1), this implies that ß0–2 should be lower (higher in absolute value) for
small deposits than for large deposits.
In order to test this hypothesis, we split our sample into two sub-samples, according to
the deposit amounts available in our data set. The first sub-sample includes deposits below
€25,000 ($23,000); the second, those above that threshold. We then estimate equation (1) for
each sub-sample. The results, reported in Table 5, indicate that in the transition period the
reduction of interest rates is much more pronounced for small deposits than for large
deposits (18.0 and 9.1 basis points, respectively; the difference is highly significant). Despite
this difference, in the long run both small and large depositors benefit from the merger.
                                                                
26  We are considering the case of a small change in the deposit rate.Table 5
EFFECT OF MERGERS ON HOUSEHOLDS’ DEPOSIT RATES BY SIZE OF THE
DEPOSIT
Panel A reports the results of estimating equation (1) of the paper for small deposits, i.e. deposits below €25,000 ($23,000).
Panel B reports the results of estimating equation (1) of the paper for large deposits (deposits equal to or above €25,000). In
Panel C we report the value of an F-test on the significance of the difference between the coefficients for small and large
deposits. Size is the banks’ total assets. Bad loans is a percentage of total loans. Cost-Income ratio is overhead divided by gross
income. Market concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the provincial deposit market (the coefficient is multiplied
by 100). New banks is a dummy equal to 1 when a new bank enters the local market.  GDP  per capita  is in  euros.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per
cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent.






(Small vs. large deposits)
Transition period (years 0-2) -0.180 *** -0.091 *** 7.09 ***
(0.022) (0.025)
Completion period (years 3+) 0.102 *** 0.150 *** 2.08
(0.023) (0.025)
Size (log value) -0.052 *** -0.050 *** 0.07
(0.006) (0.007)
Bad loans 0.031 *** 0.031 *** 0.02
(0.002) (0.002)
Cost-income ratio -0.005 *** -0.006 *** 0.02
(0.001) (0.001)
Market concentration -0.010 *** -0.013 *** 0.49
(0.003) (0.003)
New banks 0.212 *** 0.173 *** 0.25
(0.053) (0.058)
GDP per capita (log value) -0.799 *** -0.658 *** 0.40
(0.145) (0.169)
No. of  observations 11,661 11,636
R-Square 0.905 0.87128
5.2  Difference between markets with high and low concentration
A common indicator of the impact of mergers on competition is the HHI of market
concentration.
27 A high HHI could make it easier for local managers of the merged bank to
restrict the range of opportunities available to consumers — such as by closing some local
branches — and lower deposit rates. For further insight, we split our bank-province
observations into two sub-samples, one below and one above the median HHI for the local
deposit market. In the transition period we expect a larger reduction in the deposit rate in the
more highly concentrated markets.
Table 6 gives the results of estimating equation (1) for the low-HHI provinces (Panel
A) and for the high-HHI provinces (Panel B). In the transition period the fall in the deposit
rate is greater for the high-HHI provinces (19 basis points, as against 10.5 basis points for
the low-HHI sample; the difference is highly significant), indicating that the market power
effect is indeed greater in highly concentrated markets. In the completion period, the deposit
rate rises in both sub-samples.
5.3  Substantial mergers
In this section we analyze the pricing effect of substantial mergers, i.e. mergers that
have a large impact on the local market. We use two definitions of substantial mergers. One
follows Prager and Hannan (1998), who found that bank mergers that violate the U.S. DOJ
guidelines result in a significant lowering of deposit rates. In order to identify such mergers,
for each deal we compute in year t-1 (the year before the merger) the pro forma HHI, i.e. the
HHI that would have resulted from the combination of the deposits of the bidder and target
banks. We then compare this hypothetical value of the HHI with the actual value of the HHI
in year t-1 and construct dummies that identify the transition and completion periods for the
mergers that violate the DOJ guidelines. Finally, we estimate equation (1) distinguishing
between mergers that violate the guidelines and those that do not. The results are reported in
Panel A of Table 7. Consistent with the previous studies, we find that in the short run
substantial mergers increase market power considerably: in the transition period the deposit
rate falls by 24.3 basis points, as against a reduction of 12.9 basis points for non-substantial
mergers (the difference is significant at the 1 percent level). Yet, in the long run substantial
                                                                
27  Kim and Singal (1993) show that the price changes from M&As are positively related to the HHI.Table 6
EFFECT OF MERGERS ON HOUSEHOLDS’ DEPOSIT RATES
BY CONCENTRATION OF THE LOCAL MARKET
Panel A reports the results of estimating equation (1) of the paper for the provinces with below-median  Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI). Panel B reports the results of estimating equation (1) for the provinces with above-median HHI. In
Panel C we report the value of an F-test on the significance of the difference between the coefficients for low- and high-
HHI provinces. Size is the banks’ total assets. Bad loans is as a percentage of total loans. Cost-Income ratio is overhead
divided by gross income. Market concentration is the HHI of the provincial deposit market (the coefficient is multiplied by
100). New banks is a dummy equal to 1 when a new bank enters the local market.  GDP  per capita  is in  euros.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per
cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent.
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C:





Transition period (years 0-2) -0.105 *** -0.190 *** 5.0 **
(0.024) (0.030)
Completion period (years 3+) 0.134 *** 0.107 *** 0.5
(0.024) (0.031)
Size (log value) -0.040 *** -0.065 *** 6.7 ***
(0.006) (0.007)
Bad loans 0.026 *** 0.039 *** 23.1 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
Cost-income ratio -0.003 -0.016 *** 3.8 *
(0.006) (0.003)
Market concentration -0.004 *** -0.007 *** 3.3 *
(0.001) (0.001)
New banks 0.124 ** 0.244 *** 2.2
(0.061) (0.053)
GDP per capita (log value) -0.697 *** -0.595 *** 0.2
(0.161) (0.191)
No. of  observations 11,657 11,640
R-Square 0.878 0.879Table 7
EFFECT OF SUBSTANTIAL MERGERS ON HOUSEHOLDS’ DEPOSIT RATES
Panel A reports the results of estimating equation (1) of the paper separating mergers that violate the Department of
Justice (DOJ) bank merger guidelines (Herfindahl greater than 1,800, increase of over 200) from those that do not.
Panel B reports the results of estimating equation (1) separating mergers that involve a target with a local market
share of at least 3 percent. Size is the banks’ total assets. Bad loans is a percentage of total loans. Cost-Income ratio is
overhead divided by gross income. Market concentration is the HHI of the provincial deposit market (the coefficient
is multiplied by 100). New banks is a dummy equal to 1 when a new bank enters the local market. GDP per capita is
in euros. Difference Test is the value of an F-test on the difference between the coefficients for substantial and non-
substantial mergers. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a
significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent.
Panel A: Panel B:
Variables Mergers that violate the
U.S. DOJ Bank Mergers
Guidelines
Mergers with target market
share‡3%
Transition period (years 0-2)
Non-substantial mergers -0.129 *** -0.114 ***
(0.019) (0.022)
Substantial mergers -0.243 *** -0.181 ***
(0.090) (0.032)
Completion period (years 3+)
Non-substantial mergers 0.121 *** 0.129 ***
(0.020) (0.022)
Substantial mergers 0.200 ** 0.092 ***
(0.100) (0.034)
Size (log value) -0.051 *** -0.051 ***
(0.005) (0.005)
Bad loans 0.031 *** 0.031 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
Cost-income ratio -0.011 *** -0.011 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
Market concentration -0.006 *** -0.006 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
New banks 0.190 *** 0.190 ***
(0.040) (0.040)
GDP per capita (log value) -0.726 *** -0.730 ***
(0.118) (0.118)
Difference test: Substantial vs. non substantial M&As
Transition period 1.6 3.1 *
Completion period 0.6 0.8
No. of  observations 23,297 23,297
R-Square 0.878 0.87831
mergers increase deposit rates by 20 basis points. Interestingly, the long-run increase in the
deposit rates is greater for substantial mergers than for the non-substantial ones (the
difference is not significant).
28
In our second definition, a substantial merger is one in which the local market share of
the target in year t-1 is greater than 3 percent. As in the previous case, we construct dummies
to identify the transition and completion period for these mergers and re-estimate equation
(1) distinguishing mergers with targets’ local market share below or above the 3 percent
threshold (see Panel B of Table 7). Again, substantial mergers reduce deposit rates more than
non-substantial mergers (18.1 versus 11.4 basis points; the difference is highly significant)
but result in a long-run increase of the deposit rate.
5.4  Robustness of the sub-sample results
We try the alternative specifications and estimation techniques described in section
4.4. In all cases, the sub-sample results (unreported) are similar to those discussed above. We
then challenge the sub-sample results by including dummies for out-of-market mergers, but
this does not influence the estimates of the effects of in-market mergers. Moreover (i) no
market power effect is detected for out-of-market mergers in the transition period in any of
the sub-samples; (ii) for all sub-samples out-of-market mergers result in a long-run rise in
the deposit rate.
6. Is it efficiency or quality?
In the previous sections we ascribed the long-run increase in the deposit rates of
merged banks to efficiency gains. However, an alternative explanation is quality
deterioration: the complexities that might arise in integrating the workforces and the
organizational structures might have an adverse impact on the quality of products and
services. This could prompt the merged bank to raise its deposit rate in order to avoid
customer defections. In this section we  analyze the competing explanations of the rate
changes. According to our hypothesis, the rise in deposit rates in the completion period
should be correlated with efficiency gains and unrelated to changes in product quality.
                                                                
28  In unreported regressions we check the robustness of this result to alternative specifications. In all cases
the results remain qualitatively unchanged: substantial mergers generate a large short-run rate reduction
followed by a long-run increase. However, the point value of the increase is influenced by the specification
chosen, owing to the limited number of observations on mergers that violate the DOJ guidelines.32
6.1  Cost savings.
29
If the favorable rate change for depositors that we find in the long run is indeed related
to the gains from M&As, then the rise should be larger for the mergers that improve banks’
post-acquisition performance most significantly. In order to examine this issue, we split our
merger sample into two subgroups: “successful” mergers, i.e. those that during the transition
period (years t, t+1 and t+2) reduce costs more than the entire sample of reporting banks (or
increase by less); and “unsuccessful” mergers, i.e. those that generate smaller cost savings
than those of the entire sample.
30 We then estimate equation (1) distinguishing between
successful and unsuccessful mergers.
The results indicate that only successful mergers increase deposit rates (see Table 8):
for these deals the long-run rate increase is equal to 16.1 basis points and is highly
significant. In contrast, unsuccessful mergers have no effect on deposit rates (the coefficient
is slightly negative but is not significant). The short-run market power effect is similar for
the two sub-samples: in the transition period the deposit rate drops by 10.8 basis points for
the successful mergers and by 14.5 basis points for the unsuccessful ones (an F-test indicates
that the difference is not significant).
6.2  Quality changes
To test whether the post-merger rise in deposit rates is explained by quality changes,
we run regressions including controls for product quality.
 The quality of banks’ services to households is likely to be influenced by three factors.
The first is the bank’s coverage of the local market with its branch network: given the
existence of transport costs, a capillary distribution network is likely to be a key element in
the success of bank services. We proxy this factor with the number of branches per 100,000
inhabitants, defined as the ratio between the number of branches of bank i in province k and
the population. An analogous proxy is constructed using the number of ATMs. The second
gauge of service quality is the amount of time it takes to customers to perform bank
operations (e.g. to withdraw cash). We proxy this variable with the average number of
employees per branch in each local market: a high value should be associated with quicker
service and better quality. The third factor is the availability of a full range of products
(mutual funds, international payments, etc.) at a single provider. A natural proxy for this
factor is size: an increase in size might improve product diversification, allowing banks to
offer customers one-stop shopping.
                                                                
29  We thank Allen Berger for suggesting this analysis.
30   Cost savings are defined as the ratio between operating costs and gross income. The change in the cost-
income ratio between year t-1 and t is computed on the basis of the pro forma balance sheet.  
Table 8
EFFECT MERGERS ON HOUSEHOLDS’ DEPOSIT RATES:
SUCCESSFUL VS. NON-SUCCESSFUL MERGERS
The table reports the results of estimating equation (1) of the paper separating “successful” mergers
from “unsuccessful” mergers. Successful mergers are those that in the transition period (i.e. in year
t, t+1 and t+2) reduce the cost-income ratio more than the entire sample of reporting banks (or
increase by less). The change in the cost-income ratio between t-1 and t is computed using the pro
forma balance sheet. Size is the banks’ total assets. Bad loans is a percentage of total loans. Cost-
Income ratio is overhead divided by gross income. Market concentration is the HHI of the
provincial deposit market (the coefficient is multiplied by 100). New banks is a dummy equal to 1
when a new bank enters the local market. GDP per capita is in euros. Difference Test is the value of
an F-test on the difference between the coefficients for successful and unsuccessful mergers.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a
significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent.
Transition period (years 0-2)
Successful mergers -0.108 ***
(0.024)
Unsuccessful mergers -0.145 ***
(0.028)
Completion period (years 3+)




Size (log value) -0.052 ***
(0.005)
Bad loans 0.031 ***
(0.001)
Cost-income ratio -0.006 ***
(0.001)
Market concentration -0.011 ***
(0.002)
New banks 0.189 ***
(0.040)
GDP per capita (log value) -0.727 ***
(0.118)
Difference test: successful vs. unsuccessful M&As
Transition period 1.02
Completion period 18.7 ***
No. of  observations 23,297
R-Square 0.84134
The results are reported in Table 9. Our proxies for service quality all have the
expected sign and are significant (although the number of employees per branch is only
marginally so): the banks that have the potential to supply customers with all the products
and advice they need and those that offer the convenience of quick service (thanks to an
extensive branch network or large staff) pay lower rates (in Panel B we replace the number
of branches with the number of ATMs; the results are unchanged). However, the inclusion of
our proxies for service quality has little effect on the size and significance of the pricing
impact of M&As.
6.3  Discussion
The results reported in this section support the hypothesis that the long-run rise in the
deposit rates of merged banks reflects efficiency gains, while quality does not explain the
price changes documented in the previous sections. However, there are several caveats to
these findings.
First, the quality of services is likely to be influenced by variables not included in our
regressions. Ideally, we would like to have a measure of customer satisfaction, but
constructing such a measure is problematic. A number of factors that influence customers’
perception of quality may not be observable, and even if they were, it might not be possible
to proxy them with quantifiable measures. These difficulties and data constraints are
presumably the reasons why previous studies have not examined whether the price changes
reflect quality changes rather than efficiency or market power effects. Neverthless, we are
convinced that our proxies capture significant components of the quality of bank services.
The importance of the extent of the branch network is supported by the results of surveys
showing that consumers rely on nearby institutions for their banking services. For example,
Kennickell, Starr-McCluer and Sundén (1997) show that a large majority of households do
their banking near home or the workplace. Evidence from the supply side squares with this:
the number of branches in Italy, in the U.S. and in most countries continues to increase even
as the number of banks declines. This means that banks consider a strong local presence
crucial. The importance of one-stop shopping is also well documented. In fact, households
tend to cluster several financial products with their deposit account (see  Kwast,  Starr-
McCluer and  Wolken, 1997). Indeed, bankers consider providing customers with the
convenience of one-stop shopping to be one of the most important motives for consolidation
(see Group of Ten, 2001).
Second, our proxies may also capture effects unrelated to service quality. For example,
a large number of branches and of number of employees could reflect inefficiency, not the
ability to provide customers with quick service. However, this risk is attenuated by the fact
that we include the cost/income ratio, a direct measure of efficiency. Therefore our proxies
should capture quality, not inefficiency.
Finally, we acknowledge that there are other important sources of efficiency gains
besides cost saving. We focus on cost-cutting for two reasons. First, among the potential
sources of efficiency improvement, cost reduction is the most likely to have a direct
influence on prices. Second, empirical evidence shows that cost savings play a pre-eminent
role among the various sources of efficiency improvement: they represent the main source of
expected gains from mergers and are positively related to the improvement in operating
performance (see Houston, James and Ryngaert, 2001).Table 9
EFFECT OF M&AS ON HOUSEHOLDS’ DEPOSIT RATES:
RESULTS INCLUDING PROXIES FOR THE QUALITY OF SERVICES
The table reports the results of estimating equation (1). Size is the banks’ total assets. Bad loans is a percentage of
total loans. Cost-Income ratio is overhead divided by gross income. Market concentration is the HHI of the
provincial deposit market (the coefficient is multiplied by 100). New banks is a dummy equal to 1 when a new bank
enters the local market. GDP per capita is in euros. The branches and ATMs refer to the bank-province pairs and
are expressed per 100,000 inhabitants. Employees per branch refers to bank-province pairs (the coefficient is
multiplied by 10); we exclude employees working in the banks’ headquarters. Heteroskedasticity robust s tandard
errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1
and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent.
Variables Panel A Panel B
Transition period (years 0-2) -0.114 *** -0.141 ***
(0.019) (0.019)
Completion period (years 3+) 0.147 *** 0.133 ***
(0.019) (0.019)
Size (log value) -0.053 *** -0.044 ***
(0.006) (0.006)
Bad loans 0.032 *** 0.029 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
Cost-income ratio -0.006 *** -0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
Market concentration -0.011 *** -0.015 ***
(0.002) (0.003)
New banks 0.181 *** 0.065
(0.040) (0.051)
GDP per capita (log value) -0.724 *** -1.453 ***
(0.120) (0.200)
Branches (per 100,000 inhabitants) -0.011 ***
(0.001)
ATMs (per 100,000 inhabitants) -0.009 ***
(0.001)
Employees per branch -0.011 * -0.009 *
(0.006) (0.006)
No. of  observations 23,094 18,976
R-Square 0.878 0.87136
7. Summary and conclusion
The unprecedented merger movement observed in recent years is changing the
corporate landscape and raising questions about the effects of consolidation on competition.
Prior analyses of the pricing effects of M&As found that in-market consolidation generates
substantial market power, thus harming consumers. These studies, however, look only at the
short-run impact, ignoring effects that take a longer time to materialize. This paper seeks to
fill this gap in the literature.
Using a unique database that includes information on the deposit rates paid by
individual banks in local markets to different categories of depositors, we study the effect of
M&As on prices, separating short-run from long-run effects. We find strong evidence that
the short-run and the long-run consequences of mergers are different.
Consistent with previous research, we find that in the short run in-market mergers
increase market power and lead to deposit rate changes that are unfavorable to consumers.
The interest rate reduction is larger in sub-samples that are sensitive to market power, such
as small deposits, highly concentrated markets and substantial mergers. In the long run,
however, the deposit rates of the banks involved in in-market mergers rise relative to the
control sample, regardless of these features.
Out-of-market mergers (which do not change the banks’ local market shares) have no
influence on deposit rates in the short run. In the long run, like in-market mergers, they
generate an increase in the deposit rates for households.
Finally, we find that deposit rates rise only for banks that are successful in reducing
costs. In contrast, the rate changes are not explained by modifications in the quality of
services. These findings constitute evidence for the hypothesis that in the long run the
efficiency gains from mergers prevail over the market power effects, so that consumers
benefit.
This paper has important implications for research and policy analysis. Although at
each announcement of a new consolidation the benefits from the deal are emphasized by all
concerned, the empirical literature has failed to find convincing evidence of these benefits
(see for example Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001 and Kaplan, 2000 and, for banking,
the review in Piloff and Santomero,  1998). This has led some researchers to question the
usefulness of M&As (see for example Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989 for industrial firms and
Gorton and Rosen, 1995 for banks) or to refer to the “merger puzzle” (see Group of Ten,
2001). Our results suggest that taking a longer time horizon, separating the short-run from
the long-run consequences of the mergers, could help solve the puzzle. In the short run the
costs of restructuring the consolidated firm may overlay the gains, which cannot fully
emerge for years.
From the policy standpoint, policymakers should be  skeptical of claims of rapid
efficiency improvement by firms proposing consolidations. Yet if properly measured, in the
long run the efficiency benefits from M&As appear to dominate the market power effects,
suggesting that mergers can help shift assets to more productive uses.References
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